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FRANZ V O N KUTSCHERA 
R E M A R K S O N A C T I O N - T H E O R E T I C SEMANTICS 
Action-theoretic semantics is here conceived of as a semantics based on an analysis of 
speechacts in terms of concepts of a general theory of actions. The meaning theories 
closest to this conception are those by H. P. Grice and D. Lewis in "Convention". It is 
argued that for a further development of these approaches stricter definitions of the 
basic terms (for instance Grice's non-natural meaning and Lewis' common knowledge) are 
indispensable since they involve iterated applications of the terms "behave", "intend" 
etc., which cannot be handled responsibly by intuition alone. Such definitions are then 
proposed and it is shown how the two approaches by Grice and Lewis can be fitted into 
a coherent account of linguistic meaning. 
Semantic paradigms 
By far the oldest and today still the best developed and most efficient 
semantic theory is realistic semantics. It isn't really one uniform theory but 
father a group of theories, a semantic paradigm, conceiving of the relation 
between linguistic expressions and their meanings as constituted by con-
ventional coordination. The most prominent examples are the semantics for 
languages of symbolic logic and the logical semantics developed for frag-
ments of natural languages. 
In Ch. Morris' distinction of syntax, semantics and pragmatics re-
alism is a purely semantic theory. Pragmatic aspects of the use of language, 
speechacts and utterances have been no topic for this theory till the end of the 
sixties.1 A semantic for utterances was developed when index-expressions 
I shall make two distinctions here: first between types and tokens of speechacts, and 
secondly between the acts and their products: products of speechacts (as tokens) I call 
utterances (wether they be graphic or phonetic), products of speechact-types expressions. 
This two-fold distinction can be represented thus: 
act product 
type speechact-type expression 
token speechact utterance 
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like "I", "you", "here", "now", etc. were studied systematically. Such ex-
pressions make the truth-value of sentences in which they occur dependent-
upon the occasion on which they are uttered: on who speaks, who is spoken 
to, where and when the sentence is uttered. Utterances are constructed as 
ordered pairs consisting of a sentence and a point of reference - a sequence 
of parameters characterizing speaker, audience, time, place and the situation. 
The semantics for utterances differs from that for eternal sentences only in 
that they are assigned a truthvalue depending not only on worlds but also ofl 
points of reference. 
Realistic semantics for a long time was also a semantics only iot 
declarative sentences. Only they are true or false, but not questions, wishes, 
recommendations, warnings, and the like. The basic idea for an analysis of 
such other types of sentences was stated by D. Lewis in (70): A command 
like 
a) "Close the door" 
can be described by the declarative sentence 
a') "S (the speaker) askes H (the audience) to close the door". 
And a declarative like 
b) "The door is closed" 
can be described by 
b') "S informs H, that the door is closed". 
The descriptions (a') and (b') have different meanings from the sentences 
they describe: (a) is a command, but not (a'), (b) and (b') are both de-
claratives, but with different meanings, since they may have different truth-
values. Now the meanings assigned by realistic semantics to the descriptions 
(a') and (b') - let us call them descriptive meanings - can serve as a realistic 
construct for the performative meanings of the sentences described by them-
These two remarks may suffice to show that pragmatic phenomena 
are not generally beyond the reach of realistic semantics. But there are prag-
matic questions for which it has no answers to offer, for instance: "How does 
linguistic communication work?" and: "How did the first linguistic con-
ventions come about? What means of communication did the first authors of 
linguistic conventions use?"2 
2 Cf. Quinc's foreword in Lewis (69). 
The first move towards a new semantic paradigm was made by the 
theory of meaning as use, according to which the meaning of linguistic ex-
pressions can be constructed or analysed in terms of rules for their use. This 
theory, or more modestly: this approach -1 just want to mention names as 
Peirce, Morris, Wittgenstein, Quine — discovered the various uses of lan-
guage anew, the variety of "language games", and emphasized the pragmatic 
aspects of language by insisting that language is primarily an activity and that 
therefore the study of meaning has its place within pragmatics as the basic 
linguistic discipline. 
In their theories of speech acts J .L . Austin and J.R. Searle3 have 
extended these ideas towards a theory of linguistic activity. The first really 
action-theoretic analyses of linguistic phenomena — in my understanding of 
this term - were however given by H. P. Grice and D. Lewis.4 
II. What is an action-theoretic semantics? 
Action-theoretic semantics can be roughly characterized by the fol-
lowing fundamental ideas: 
It starts with an analysis of speechacts as a special sort of acts. There is a 
notion of meaning defined for all types of acts. We understand an action, if we 
tecognize what the agent intends to achieve by it. What we understand in 
this sense may be termed the meaning of the act. The meaning of an act, 
therefore, is the intention the agent has in doing it.5 The meaning of speech 
acts in an action-theoretic approach is defined according to this general 
scheme. 
The distinctive character of speech acts (more generally: of acts of signifying 
something) is that the speaker or communicator wants to signify, to indicate 
something to the audience or adressee. So the act is successful only if the 
latter understands the significance, the meaning of the act. Following Grice 
this can be stated thus: In communicative acts the speaker wants to elicit 
some reaction or response in the audience - he wants him to do something or 
3 a. Austin (62) and Searle (69). 
4 Cf. Grice (57), (68), (68a), (69) and Lewis (69). 
5 This holds only for (rational) actions proceeding from choices under certainty. To 
understand an action proceeding from a choice under risk means to recognize it as 
optimal given the agent's preferences and probability-assignments. In such cases we 
cannot normally speak of "intentions". The following discussions refer only to choices 
under certainty, however. 
believe something, for instance; that is the speakers primary intention. But 
he also intends, that his intention should be understood by the adressee, 
because this recognition is, in the speaker's opinion, a prerequisite for the 
adressee's desired reaction. 
Our behavior may be a symptom or a natural sign for others, as for 
instance speaking very quickly may be a sign that we are excited. We can also 
produce such symptoms voluntarily; wrinkling one's brow, for instance, 
indicates to another that we disagree with what he says or have doubts about 
it. In signifying acts by which we indicate something, as Grice says, non-
naturally, our behavior is not a natural sign for what we wish to indicate. 
Such acts have to be understood as voluntary, as intentional by the audience 
in order to elicit the intended response. 
Actions like mowing one's lawn which, though perfectly understandable for 
everyone, are not signifying acts since the recognition of their intention is 
not a prerequisite for them being successful. For others to recognize the 
communicative intention of an act it is necessary that without this intention 
it would be meaningless. Acts which are "in themselves" meaningless will, 
as a rule, only be understood as signifying something, if acts of the same type 
are generally done with the same purpose, and if this is common knowledge 
between speaker and audience. Only then has the speaker reason to believe 
that the adressee will understand his intention, and only then has the adressee 
reason to interpret the act in this way. Grice mainly discusses exceptions to 
this rule, and in special cases things may indeed be successfully signified 
without relying on a general practice. But general practices are quite in-
dispensable if we look not at isolated communicative acts but at types of such 
acts. If for employing them there were no convention, their function would 
not be understandable and it could not be explained, why they are (as a rule) 
successful ways of communicating. What a convention is, and how on the 
basis of conventions attempts of non-natural communication are rational, D. 
Lewis has stated in (69). His theory of signaling-conventions, therefore, is an 
indispensable complement of Grice's approach. It closes a gap in Grice's 
theory by answering the question, why and when attempts of communi-
cation with certain acts and interpretations of such acts make sense. 
We can say, then, in a first rough approximation, that holds especially 
for speech acts: An action-theoretic semantics is a theory of the meaning (in 
the pre-linguistic sense) of conventionalized signifying acts. To prevent 
misunderstandings: I think it a merit of Grice's approach that he doesn't 
restrict his analysis of communication to conventionalized forms. There are 
important forms of non-conventional communication, and therefore a 
theory only of conventional communication would not be the whole story. 
But on the other hand I think that conventional communication is not just a 
special case, but that the notion of meaning of types of communicative acts, 
specially of linguistic communications can only be understood by reference 
to conventions. 
The attraction of such an action-theoretic semantics is that it can do 
things that realistic semantics cannot do: analyses of phenomena of language 
use and of the processes of communicating with language. We shall have to 
inquire, however, if such a theory can replace realistic semantics, i . e. if it is an 
alternative to it, or if it is only an important addition. Before we come to that, 
however, something has to be said about the state of the theory. 
H i . The indispensability of action-theoretic explications 
An action-theoretic semantics should, of course, be based on a theory 
of actions, or better: on a logic of actions, in which the fundamental concepts 
that have to do with actions are explained and analysed. Such a concept is, 
first of all, the notion of an action itself. Since our (rational) actions depend 
on what we want and what we believe, the following three groups of con-
cepts are to be assigned to a logic of actions: 
1. Praxiological concepts: The basic ones are those of acting and causing.6 
The most fruitful approach towards a logic of these concepts seems to me 
that made by L. Aqvist in (74).7 With these notions further praxiological 
concepts may be defined like omitting to do something, to prevent and to 
permit something to happen, to be able to do something, etc.8 
2. Doxastic concepts: The fundamental notion here is that of subjective 
probability. The logic of this concept was developed foremost by B. de 
Pinetti. Other doxastic concepts like conviction, belief, etc. can be defined with 
it.* 
3. Voluntative and valuative concepts: Here the concept of (subjective) 
preference, as used in decision theory is fundamental.10 The basic voluntative 
With a view to the distinction of Z. Vendler in (67), chap. 4, there will in fact be various 
action concepts. 
I have proposed some modifications and generalisations of this approach in (80). 
Cf. Kutschera (80). 
I have discussed this in (76), chap. 4. For a more detailed exposition cf. W. Lenzen (80). 
Cf. e.g. R. Jeffrey (69). 
concept of wanting something to be the case is closely connected with it.11 
Further important voluntative notions are intention and aim. We can say: 
D l : A person a intends to bring about the state of affairs p by doing f iff 
a does f, wants p to come about, and is convinced that p will come 
about if and only if a does f.12 
An aim of an action is the state of affairs the agent intends to bring about by 
that action. 
Although an intuitively as well as formally well established logic of 
actions docs not yet exist, there are already important ingredients and ele-
ments of such a logic, so that a demand for action-logical explications of 
semantic concepts is not illusory. 
The indispensability of such explications can, I think, be clearly seen, 
if we take a closer look at some of the basic notions of action-theoretic 
semantics: 
1. Grice's concept of non-natural meaning 
The fundamental notion of Grice's theory of meaning is - in a loose 
paraphrase - 'S (the speaker), in doing f, tries to indicate (in a non-natural 
way) to H (the audience), that he should do r' - we symbolize this by 
KV(S,H,f,r). In (69) Grice explains this as follows: 
D2: K V (S, H , f, r) holds iff S, in doing f, intends to bring it about that 
a) H does r, 
b) H recognizes, that S intends, that (a), 
c) (a) comes about by (b). 
Now it doesn't make much sense to say that S intends that (a) should come 
about by (b), since the way (a) comes about cannot normally be influenced by 
S. One can only say that S believes that (a) will come about if and only if (b). 
If we write 
«T(S,f)" for "S does f' 
"G(S,p)" for "S believes (in the strong sense of being convinced) 
that p", 
I have made a tentative proposal for an explication of this concept in (80), sect. 8. 
We again refer only to actions proceeding from decisions under certainty. 
"I(S,f,p)" for "S, in doing f, intends to bring it about that p" (cf. 
Dl)» 
can write D2 as 
D 2 + : KV(S, H,f, r) == I(S,f,T" (H, r)) 
Al(S,f )G"(H,I)) 
AG'(S,T"(H,r) =G"(H,I)). 
Here t' is to be a time before t (the time in which S does £) and t" a time after t 
tt* which H recognizes what S did in t and reacts correspondingly. The 
indices ' and " are to indicate that the propositions refer to t', or t" re-
spectively. I is to be an abbreviation of I(S,f,T"(H,r)).14 
Now, even definition D2+ yields a concept that cannot be handled 
responsibly by mere intuition. The definiens speaks of intending that some-
body believes that someone else intends something and this is already 
more complex than what occurs in normal discourse. The demand after 
logical crutches for intuition becomes, however, still more pressing if we 
realize that the defining conditions of D2+ are necessary but not sufficient 
for non-natural meaning in the sense outlined above. According to this idea 
the audience must not only recognize the primary intention I (S, f, T" (H, r)), 
but all communicative intentions of the speaker, including the secondary 
intention I(S,f,G"(H,I)), and then also I(S,f,G"(H,I(S,f,G"(H,I))), etc. 
This has come out clearly in the discussions of Grice's definition, especially 
*** P.F. Strawson (64) and S. Schiffer (72). This leads to the following con-
dition of adequacy for the notion K V : 
PI: KV(S,H,f,r) == I(S,f,T"(H,r)) 
Al(S,f,G"(H,KV)) 
AG '(S,T"(H,r) =G"(H,KV)). 
As a definition this would clearly be circular. But we can set 
Dl then becomes 
D1 + : I(S,f,p)MT(S,f),G'(SJ(S,f)>p) 
According to the definition of "wanting that something be the case" given in 
Kutschera (80), it follows from the definiens that S wants (in t'), that p comes about -
otherwise S would not do f, since S is convinced that p will happen iff S does f. 
We assume that S believes in t', that H will recognize in t" wether S does f, i. e. 
G'(S,(T(S,0?G-(H,T(S,0)),(-iT(S,f)?G''(H,-iT(S,f)))). 
D3a)KV t :=I(S,f,T"(H,r)) 
b) KV n + 1 :=I(S ,f ,G"(H,KV n ) ) 
c) K V * AnKV n . 
KV* then satisfies condition PI. 1 5 
It is quite clear, that in dealing with notions like this one cannot do 
without logic. This also holds for the other central concepts employed in 
Grice's approach: successful (non-natural) indications, in which the audience 
recognizes the communicative intentions of the speaker, and meaning. 
2. Grice's meaning concept 
According to the general notion of the meaning of acts outlined 
above we can say: For the utterer (speaker) an attempted indication means 
that the audience should recognize its communicative intentions and react 
correspondingly. The attempt has the same meaning for listener and speaker 
if both understand it in the same way, i . e. if it is successful. A type of signify-
ing act (a type of speech acts) has a common meaning in situations of a certain 
kind S for a group P of people only if they employ it in situations of this sort 
just in this communicative function, and if all the members of P know this 
and therefore always understand acts of this type in situations of kind ® in 
this way. Moreover it must be common knowledge in P that this is so. This 
notion of common knowledge, which plays an important role also in D. 
Lewis' theory of conventions, again demands a logical explanation - here in 
terms of epistemic logic. 
That it is common knowledge in P, that a state of affair p obtains, may 
be defined thus: 
D4 a) GG t(P,p):= AX(XeP =>G(X,p)) 
b) G G n + 1 (P,p) := G G , (P,GGn(P,p)) 
c) GG(P,p) := AnGGn(P,p) ~ it is common belief in P that p. 
d) GW (P, p) •.= GG (P, p) A p - it is common knowledge in P that p. 
It has often been objected that the speaker could not possibly have all of the infinite 
number of intentions ascribed to him by D3. But this is off the mark: The speaker 
intends that his intention be fully understood by the audience. This implies that he has 
all the intentions listed in D3, but he need not have them explicitly in mind, of course, 
or think of them. There is an analogy in believing: If you believe, that p, you also 
believe, that you believe, that p, and so on, but that doesn't make simple beliefs 
impossible; you don't have to think of all these propositions in order to believe that p. 
Here, too, we have interlocked occurences of belief-predicates surpassing 
every finite border, so that it is quite impossible to work with this concept in 
a merely intuitive way. 
Let me add two more definitions: 
D5: B(P ,S , f , r ) := AsXY(se S AS(X,s) A H ( Y , S ) AT(X,f) ^ 
KV*(X,Y,f,r)). 
^ in P doing f in situations of kind © is trying to indicate to the hearer that he 
(or they -1 take the audience to consist just of one person for simplicity here) 
should do r iff for all situations s of kind S and all persons X and Y the 
following holds: if X in s is the speaker and Y the audience (this is to imply 
that X, or Y respectively, is a member of P) and X does f, then X attempts to 
indicate to Y in doing f that Y should do r. 
Then the relation 'doing f in situations of kind S means in P to 
mdicate to the audience that he should do r' has to be defined by 
D6: B*(P ,e , f , r ) :=GW(P,B(P,S,f , r ) ) . 
B * (P, S , f, r) implies that for all se S we have G' (S, T" ( H , r) = T (S, f)). If 
^-situations occur repeatedly these convictions are plausible only if they are 
correct in almost all such situations. The condition 
GW (P, A s (se S = G' (S, T" (H, r) = T (S, f)) contained in B * (P, S, f, r) 
will be true therefore only if 
P2: GW(P, As ( se® =>(T"(H,r) = T(S,f)))), 
where " A " means "almost all". With a few other unproblematic assump-
tions it follows from B * ( P , ®,f,r) and P2 that the strategy to indicate by 
doing f in situations of kind S that the audience should do r is a signal-
convention in the sense of D. Lewis. On the other hand, as Lewis has shown, 
every use of a signal-convention by the speaker is an attempt to indicate 
something non-naturally. This explains the connection between the ap-
proaches of Grice and Lewis that was indicated above.16 
IV. Signals and Languages 
Grice's theory of meaning has only been developed for isolated signs 
or signals, like flag-signals, for instance, but not for languages. A language, 
A part of the detailed explications of the concepts of action-theoretic semantics was 
published in G. Meggle's dissertation (80). The other part as well as the proofs of the 
two theorems mentioned will be contained in another book. 
however, is not a set of isolated signals, but a system in which complex signs 
are built up from simple ones and in which there are rules specifying how the 
meanings of complex signs derive from those of the simple components. 
Only in this way a language with a finite vocabulary and finitely many rules 
can encompass infinitely many sentences. 
Now the semantic rules for a language cannot be constructed as rules 
determining the meaning of complex (types of) speech acts from simple 
(types of) speech acts. Complex speech acts do not consist of simple ones. A 
speech act is always a (relatively) independent communication. In contrast to 
Searle I do not think that we can regard predicating, referring and perhaps 
even negating, conjuncting, quantifying etc. as types of speech acts. This 
would not be in accordance with the act-theoretic approach, since there are 
no intentions of the speaker that we could assign to such acts. 
D. Lewis has taken the other extreme. He first defines a language L in 
the sense of realistic semantics, including performatory verbs and then as-
sumes just one convention in the language community P, namely that all 
members of P endeavour to be truthful in L . 1 7 What this means is stated for 
the various performative modes: One is truthful in L, if one tries to utter a 
declarative sentence only if it is true in L, to obey a command, if one is 
obliged to do so, etc. 
In this approach no attempt is made to reconstruct the concepts of 
realistic semantics, especially descriptive meanings in the framework of act-
theoretic semantics. The whole apparatus of realistic semantics is introduced 
quite independently from this frame so that this semantics, when it comes to 
the analyses of languages, presupposes realistic semantics and cannot, there-
fore, be regarded as an alternative to it. 
In (76), p.l74ffl have indicated how one might introduce - more in 
the spirit of the action-theoretic approach - descriptive meanings in the 
context of speech act conventions. I don't want to go into this here, how-
ever, since this proposal just gives a more detailed analysis of the con-
ventional correlation of descriptive meanings to linguistic expressions, but 
nothing like a reduction of descriptive meanings, of objects, attributes, pro-
positions and the like to act-theoretic distinctions. This, indeed, cannot be 
done, since the logic of actions itself employs such notions. It would also be 
imprudent to burden the logic of action and the action-theoretic approach to 
semantics with nominalistic idiosyncrasies and try to eliminate such, in this 
view, obnoxious entities as attributes and propositions. 
a. Lewis (69), 192ff. 
The machinery of realistic semantics, though it may be adapted to 
^on-theoretic ideas, therefore seems indispensable. But since this ma-
chinery of attributes, propositions, functions etc. is not just employed in 
*calistic semantics but in all kinds of theories this does not mean that action-
theoretic semantics is no alternative to the. realistic one and only an important 
tddition to it. Since the two approaches define meanings in a fundamentally 
different way it is justified to speak of two distinct semantic paradigms. 
The action-theoretic approach gives, I think, an interesting and fruit-
ful analysis of the notion of meaning, but it, like any other approach, should 
Qot be overestimated. There isn't, and there cannot be, any one complete 
theory of language treating all linguistic phenomena and answering all ques-
tions about language. All theories about language can only analyse some of 
its aspects. Especially all attempts to "reduce" language to non-linguistic 
Phenomena or to "explain" language are doomed to failure, simply because 
^ch theory presupposes a language in which it is formulated and it cannot 
then be a complete and consistent theory of this language. 
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